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Abstract
The sharp increase in volatility of capital flows in recent years has resulted in many
countries altering the regulations governing the flow of foreign capital only to find
such changes having a limited impact. We postulate that one reason for the limited
effectiveness of such changes in regulations is the level of financial sector development
in the country. As a country enhances its level of financial sector development, it also
develops more and more sophisticated financial instruments. The more advanced the
domestic financial instruments are, and the deeper is the integration of the domestic
financial markets with the world markets, the greater is the likelihood of developing
strategies to bypass capital account management measures. In this paper, we undertake
various empirical techniques to identify the impact of financial sector development on
capital flows, accounting for regulatory regime. The empirical results indicate that
there is a threshold effect in the financial sector development capital flow relationship.
In particular, financial sector development augments greater integration with global
capital flows only above a threshold level. Below the threshold level we find financial
development reduces the extent of integration with global capital markets.
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1 Introduction
During the last two and a half decades, emerging markets have been subject to the
substantial vagaries of capital flows. Gross capital inflows (as a % of GDP) to emerging
markets more than doubled from being around 2.8% of GDP in the first quarter of 1990
to around 7.0% in the last quarter of 1996 (Figure A1).1 However, they collapsed to
1.3% of GDP in the fourth quarter of 1997, as several countries in East and South
East Asia entered into a crisis. After remaining subdued for the next few years, inflows
started picking up from early 2000s, reaching a peak of 12.5% of GDP in the second
quarter of 2007. The onset of the sub-prime crisis in 2007, and the subsequent Global
Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, resulted in a strong reversal of flows to emerging
markets, resulting in gross capital outflows to the extent of 4.9% of GDP. Subsequently,
the pursuit of unconventional monetary policy in the advanced economies in the form
of low interest rates, to boost aggregate demand, resulted in a large quantum of capital
flowing into the emerging markets.
Such heightened volatility in capital flows has significantly enhanced the complex-
ities involved in balancing the diverse objectives of managing the macroeconomy, and
has rekindled the debate on imposing various macroeconomic and capital account man-
agement measures to manage these capital flows. These measures have been aimed at
resisting excessive currency appreciation that would make domestic exports uncompet-
itive, prevent creation of asset bubbles, bursting of which can entail a significant cost,
retain monetary policy autonomy, which is essential to maintain macroeconomic stabil-
ity, and reduce vulnerability from contagion effects (Magud and Reinhart, 2006). In the
post-GFC period, as the unconventional monetary policies in the advanced economies
resulted in a surge of capital flows into emerging markets, several countries such as
Brazil, Peru, Korea and Indonesia imposed capital flow management measures such as
tax on inflows, additional capital requirements for foreign exchange credit exposure,
minimum holding period and withholding tax to manage the volatility of these flows.
These changes in regulations were reflected in a drop in de jure capital account open-
ness in many countries. In contrast, this had a limited impact on de facto openness,
as generally measured by cross border acquisition of assets and liabilities.
In this paper we postulate that one reason for changes in regulations, reflected
in change in de jure openness, having negligible impact on de facto openness, is the
1As pointed out in Bluedorn et al. (2013), gross inflows arise when the economy incurs more external
liabilities (inflows with a positive sign) or the economy reduces its external liabilities (inflows with a negative
sign). Thus, gross inflows are net sales of domestic financial instruments to foreign residents. Gross outflows
arise when the economy acquires more external assets (outflows with a positive sign) or the economy reduces
its holdings of external assets (outflows with a negative sign). Thus, gross outflows are net purchases
of foreign financial instruments by domestic residents. Net capital flows are the difference between gross
inflows and outflows.
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level of financial sector development in a country. In particular, we empirically test
the hypothesis that increased financial sector development leads to a higher degree
of de facto openness, even after controlling for de jure capital account openness. As
a country enhances its level of financial sector development, it develops more and
more sophisticated financial instruments. The more advanced the domestic financial
instruments are, and the deeper is the integration of the domestic financial markets
with the world markets, the greater is the likelihood of developing strategies to bypass
capital flow management measures. Moreover, strategies to evade these measures tend
to develop rapidly, especially in the case of selective measures targeting specific kinds
of flows. Uniform restrictions tend to be easier to enforce, but they are obviously
incapable of altering the composition of flows, which is the key issue from macro-
prudential perspective.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review
of the literature. In Section 3, we analyze the evolution of de facto openness and
various determinants found in the literature influencing de facto openness. In Section
4, we examines the link between de facto openness and financial sector development
using a variety of econometric techniques. Finally, Section 5 concludes with the main
highlights of the paper.
2 Literature Review
With global capital flows being inherently volatile, many countries have sought to
implement measures aimed at managing cross border flow (Bluedorn et al., 2013).
These measures have ranged from resisting sharp movements in the exchange rate,
retaining monetary autonomy to respond to needs of the macroeconomy, managing the
flow of hot money to avoid the formation of asset bubbles and stemming the risks of
contagion in the event of a financial crisis occurring in other economies (Coelho and
Gallagher, 2010; Magud and Reinhart, 2006). Consequently, many of the financially
open economies have employed capital flow management measures at different points
in time and to varying degrees.2
Cross border capital flows are influenced by numerous factors. In the literature,
these factors are classified into two categories, push factors or global factors that are
extraneous to the host countries and pull factors, which tend to be country specific
(Fratzscher, 2012; Volz, 2012).3 During the late 1980s and early 1990s, both these
2For details on benefits and costs of financial openness see Prasad et al. (2007b) and Kose et al. (2009).
3Global factors include appetite for risk, global liquidity, interest rate differentials due to changes in
monetary and fiscal policies in advanced economies and occurrence of crisis in one or more economies.
Country specific factors include rates of economic growth, macroeconomic stability, resource endowment,
institutional quality and size and fragility of the financial sector.
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factors have been found to be major determinants of cross border flows. For instance,
the large volumes of capital flows from United States to Latin American and Asian
economies were found to be equally sensitive to push and pull factors thus giving them
equal significance (Taylor and Sarno, 1997). However, with global capital flows surging
to economies with very diverse characteristics in the first half of 2000s it was realized
that global factors like cyclical movements in interest rates and risk appetite seem cru-
cial in driving these flows (Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Fratzscher, 2012; Milesi-Ferretti
and Tille, 2011; Volz, 2012). In a recent paper Pagliari and Hannan (2017), conduct an
empirical exercise, and conclude that push factors tend to be more important compared
to pull factors when explaining volatility of capital flows.
The predominance of global factors in recent years have undermined the role played
by domestic factors, and has resulted in volume of cross border capital flowing into a
country being discordant with the absorptive capacity of that country. This resulted in
numerous macroeconomic tensions in the economy, and forced economies to introduce
various capital account management measures. However, the efficacy of these measures
has been mixed at best. Baba and Kokenyne (2011) conclude that price based capi-
tal flow management measures were not significantly effective in discouraging capital
inflows or altering their composition in selected Asian and Latin American countries.
Hutchison (2012) undertakes a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence on the
efficacy of capital controls focusing on the impact of the controls on exchange rate
volatility, disruptive effects of volatile short-term and speculative capital flows and loss
of monetary autonomy. The paper concludes that there is limited evidence of these
measures having an impact on warding off currency crisis or sudden stops, although
there is some evidence of these measures slowing aggregate flows in the desired direc-
tion and shifting the composition of capital flows towards longer maturity. Capital flow
management measures were found to be most successful in providing some autonomy
to the monetary authorities. However, most of impact was temporary, and withered
away over a period. Studies like Basu et al. (2015) and Sengupta and Sen Gupta (2016)
have shown that imposition of ad hoc capital flow management measures tend to have
negligible impact on cross border capital flow in various Asian economies.
Ariyoshi et al. (2000) point out that a key factor that limits the effectiveness of the
capital flow management measures is the presence of developed financial sector, which
reduces the cost of circumvention relative to the incentives. Garber (1998) highlight
the use of offshore derivatives trading to dodge these measures. Focusing on Brazil,
de M. Carvalho and Garcia (2008) highlight numerous examples where sophisticated
financial markets helped investors circumvent the capital flow management measures.
These have ranged from financial instruments being used to disguise short-term invest-
ments as long-term, equity, or trade-finance to use of derivatives.
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Consequently, while a large volume of the existing research, including Rajan and
Zingales (1998), Levine (2005) and Demetriades and Andrianova (2005) have found
that a deep and well-functioning financial system is a key element behind economic
growth, it can have unintended consequences like limiting the effectiveness of capital
flow management measures.4 A large volume of literature has focused on the reverse
channel of causation i.e. increased de facto openness has fostered greater financial sec-
tor development through different ways. Liberalization of the capital account would
help interest rates achieve their competitive equilibrium by easing financial repression
(McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). This would significantly improve the efficiency of re-
source allocation. Chinn and Ito (2006) point out that dismantling of capital controls
widens the availability of funds for borrowers while allowing domestic and foreign in-
vestors to engage in improved portfolio diversification. Finally, the resultant rise in
competition because of capital account liberalization would also weed out the existing
inefficient financial systems and thereby increase the overall efficiency level of the finan-
cial system (Claessens et al., 2001; Stiglitz, 2000). Baltagi et al. (2009) also argue that
both trade and financial openness, as well as quality of economic institutions, explain
a large part of the variation in financial sector development across countries.
3 Evolution of Key Variables Impacting Capital
Flows
Over the last two and a half decades, most countries have significantly liberalized cross
border movement of capital. Cross-border holding of financial assets and liabilities,
a measure of de facto openness, developed in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), rose
sharply from being equal to world GDP in early 1990s, to a peak of over 300% of
world GDP in 2007 (Figure 1). Immediately, after GFC, there was a drop in de facto
openness due to rise in risk averseness among global investors and diminished cross-
border activity by banks in the advanced economies. The unconventional monetary
policies introduced in various advanced economies to aid their recovery led to a rise in
cross border acquisition of assets and liabilities from 2009 onwards, especially in the
advanced economies. However, the onset of the Eurozone crisis in 2010, and tapering
of its bond buying program by the Federal Reserve Bank in United States in 2013 have
resulted in the extent of de facto openness remaining stagnant over the last few years.
4However, the relationship between financial sector development and growth is not monotonic. Law and
Singh (2014) provide an overview of the literature that explains the non-linear relationship between financial
sector development and growth. The reasons forwarded for the non-linear relationship extend from the
financial sector competing with the rest of the economy for scarce resources to financial sector developing
instruments that have limited beneficial impact on the real sector but can promote excessive risk-taking
behavior, and lead to a costly crisis.
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One of the factors driving the increase in cross-border holding of assets and liabilities
during the 1990s and 2000s could be the progressive liberalization of the guidelines
governing the ownership of these assets and liabilities. Figure 1 highlights the evolution
of a de jure capital account liberalization index, which is based on the legal restrictions
imposed on cross-border financial transactions.5 The index is developed in Chinn
and Ito (2006). However, as is evident, the increase in de jure openness is relatively
muted compared to evolution of de facto openness. Thus there are factors, other than
liberalization of capital flow management measures, that have contributed to rise in
volume of cross-border transactions.
One such factor is the stance of monetary policy followed in the advanced economies.
For a substantial period since the early 2000s, advanced economies have pursued a lax
monetary policy, allowing the balance sheets of the central banks in these economies
to expand substantially (Figure 2). The pace of accumulation of central bank assets
(as a % of GDP) in advanced economies started increasing since the mid-1990s and
continued till 2006. The signals of onset of the sub-prime crisis, and the subsequent
onset of the GFC led to a temporary decline in the accumulation of assets by the
central bank. In the aftermath of GFC, central banks of the advanced economies
implemented unconventional monetary policies to restore financial market stability
and bolster economic activity. Apart from sharply reducing policy rates, these policy
measures included a large volume of asset purchases to reduce long-term yield and
rekindle aggregate demand. Sahay et al. (2014) point out that Quantitative Easing
(QE) by the United States led to a 750% increase in the balance sheet of the Federal
Reserve Bank.
Rising trade openness has often been cited as influencing capital flows through a
variety of channels. Antras and Caballero (2009) argue that in less financially devel-
oped countries trade integration increases the incentives for capital to flow into these
economies. In such economies there exist numerous financial constraints that mis-
allocate capital across sectors. Trade alleviates this misallocation problem, thereby
incentivizing capital to flow into these countries. Taylor and Wilson (2006) also estab-
lish a positive effect of trade on financial flows, arguing that trade decreases asymmetric
information and hence enhances capital flows. Furthermore, with increasing openness
to international trade, it becomes difficult to maintain restrictions on capital flows as
greater trade openness provides numerous opportunities for evading these capital flow
restrictions by misinvoicing the trade transactions (Patnaik et al., 2012).
Moreover, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that unless trade and capital account
openness proceed in a collaborative manner there are increased chances economic dis-
5This index measures the level of capital account openness based on restrictions on cross-border financial
transactions reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER).
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tortions. For example, opening up to trade, without a commensurate level of capital
account openness can lead to financial repression as the domestic industry would de-
mand finance at cheaper rates to challenge foreign competition. Similarly, liberalizing
flow of foreign capital alone can result in domestic large firms, by getting selective
access to foreign funds, to be at an advantage compared to its competitors. The last
two and a half decades have witnessed trade openness, measured as the ratio of the
sum of exports and imports to a country’s GDP, increasing across various countries
(Figure 3). This ratio rose to its peak levels by 2006 before the sub-prime crisis and
the subsequent GFC led to a sharp drop in the ratio during 2007 to 2009. The ratios
have recovered a bit thereafter but continues to be well below its peak level.
The quality of institutions in an economy is also an important factor in driving cap-
ital flows. Investors often base their decisions on the quality of institution in the host
country, apart from the economic pull factors. The standard neoclassical theory pre-
dicts that capital will flow to countries with a higher expected net value of investment.
However, this expected value can be affected by institutional quality as the latter takes
into account property rights and credibility of government policy. An improvement in
institutional quality should attract greater capital inflows as investors look for safer
investments (flight to quality). At the same time, better institutions would also result
in domestic agents allocating more capital in the residence country instead of taking
it abroad. The quality of institution is assessed using the set of institutional variables
available from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), estimated by Kaufmann
et al. (2009). The indicators encompass (i) likelihood of an unconstitutional change in
government with or without violence, (ii) credibility of policies and its independence
from political pressures, (iii) government’s ability to implement policies to boost private
sector development, (iv) extent to which citizen’s are able to participate in selecting
their government and their freedom of expression, (v) extent to which public power is
exercised for private gain and (vi) extent to which agents have confidence in and abide
by the rules society, especially those related to contract enforcement, property rights,
police and the courts. These indexes have been normalized to have zero mean and unit
standard deviation.
The evolution of these indicators are outlined in Figure 4. It is evident that across
the different indicators, institutional quality in advanced economies is better than
emerging markets. Since these indicators are highly correlated, (R2 ≥ 0.7), we create
an institutional quality index by extracting a component of the six governance indica-
tors, using the principal component analysis (Figure 5). This index also reduces the
measurement error and sorts out multicollinearity issues.
Although, across all the indicators, there is limited variation for a country group
over the period 1996 to 2015, there is considerable variation within the countries.
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Figure 5 shows that in 2014, the institutional quality index ranged from -1.81 for
Equatorial Guinea to 2.32 for New Zealand. Generally, countries in sub-Saharan Africa,
Latin America, Middle East and South Asia have negative values, while the OECD
economies and selected economies of East and South East Asia have positive values.
Furthermore, overall economic growth can also influence the cross border acquisition
of assets and liabilities, as a healthy GDP growth is associated with new investment
opportunities arising in that economy and thereby attracts both domestic and foreign
investors.
Finally, in this paper, we argue that a key determinant of cross border flow of
capital is the extent of financial sector development in an economy. During the last
two decades, alongside a rising capital account openness, several countries have experi-
enced an unprecedented progress in the development of the financial sector (Figure 6).
Moreover, this increase in the level of financial sector development is robust to different
indicators of financial sector development. As can be seen in Appendix Tables A1, bar-
ring the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP, all the other measures of financial
sector development are highly correlated with each other (R2 ≥ 0.65). These trends
towards deregulation and privatization in financial sector can influence the behavior of
domestic and foreign investors, and thereby on the volume and composition of capital
inflows and outflows.
Foreign investors tend to be hampered by the lack of knowledge of domestic condi-
tions while investing in a distant location. They are neither aware of the risks nor the
opportunities of the local markets as well as local investors. Financial intermediaries,
by extending their knowledge about local market risks to foreign investors are able to
provide credibility to potential profit thereby stimulating their entry. A well developed
financial sector also promotes cross border capital flow by facilitating interactions be-
tween foreign firms and local firms. Similarly, portfolio flows are contingent on certain
level of financial sector development such as a well developed equity and bond markets.
Furthermore, a well developed financial sector is able to generate instruments through
financial engineering that can circumvent existing capital flow management measures.
The relationship between de jure capital account openness and de facto openness
across countries with different levels of financial sector development is highlighted in
Figure A2.6 It is evident that in countries with low levels of financial sector development
6Here financial sector development is proxied by the ratio of credit provided by domestic financial institu-
tions to the private sector to GDP. We calculate the average of this ratio for a country over the period 1990
to 2015. We take median value of this ratio, taking out the outliers. Countries placed above the median
value are categorized as countries with high levels of financial sector development, while countries with val-
ues above the median are characterized as countries with low levels of financial sector development. Annual
averages for de facto and de jure openness are calculated by taking the mean of values for a country over
the period 1990 to 2015. To test the robustness, we use alternate measures of financial sector development
like ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, ratio of credit by the banking system to private sector to GDP, and
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there is no relationship between de jure and de facto openness. However, for economies
with high levels of financial sector development, there exists a significantly positive
relationship between de jure and de facto openness. Moreover, Figure A2 also shows
that for a given level of de jure capital account openness, countries with high level
of financial sector development exhibit higher degree of de facto openness compared
to countries where the financial sector is less financially developed. For example the
average de jure openness in countries with high levels of financial sector development
at 0.68 is not substantially different from that in countries with low levels of financial
sector development, where de jure openness averages 0.58. However, the average level
of de facto openness at 2.3 in the former is nearly double of 1.2 witnessed in the latter.
Thus our main testable hypothesis is that for similar degrees of de jure openness,
countries with higher financial sector development experience greater cross border ac-
quisition of assets and liabilities. We focus on the period 1990 to 2014 across advanced
and emerging markets.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Data Sources
As discussed above, de facto capital account openness is measured by the ratio of for-
eign assets and liabilities to GDP, and the data is sourced from External Wealth of
Nations dataset built in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The authors estimate external
assets and liabilities for 211 industrial and developing countries using the international
investment position figures published by national central banks, governments and mul-
tilateral agencies over the period 1970 to 2015. The dataset covers total foreign assets
and liabilities as well as breaks down these to FDI, debt, and portfolio assets and
liabilities.
For de jure capital account openness, we use the index developed in Chinn and Ito
(2006). The index is based on information regarding restrictions in the International
Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restric-
tions (AREAER). Specifically, the index is the first standardized principal component
of the variables that indicate the presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on
current account transactions, on capital account transactions, and the requirement of
the surrender of export proceeds. The dataset covers 182 countries over the period
1970 to 2014.
Financial sector development can be captured in a variety of ways. One can focus on
the banking sector as well as the stock or bond market. However, availability of cross-
ratio of financial system deposits to GDP. The results are broadly similar across different specifications.
9
country data on development of the stock market, bond market or the mutual fund is
limited, as can be seen in Appendix Table A1. Hence we focus on the banking system,
and focus on the ratio of credit provided by the banking system to the private sector to
GDP as our main indicator of financial sector development. To check the robustness of
our results, we also use alternate indicators of financial sector development including
the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP. The data is sourced from
Financial Development and Structure developed in Beck et al. (2010) and updated in
Cihak et al. (2012). The dataset covers 203 countries over the period 1960 to 2014.
To capture the impact of unconventional monetary policies we consider the inter-
est rate differential between an individual country and the risk free rate. Given the
extremely low probability of default by the United States on its treasury securities we
consider the interest rate on these securities as the nominal risk free rate. However,
global investors would be not only focus on nominal returns but would be concerned
about the real return, which would be influenced by exchange rate movements, which
in turn would be impacted by relative price differentials. Hence we focus on real in-
terest rates by considering the real risk free interest rate for the individual countries,
and taking the difference with the US risk free rate to obtain the real interest rate
differential. The data is sourced from World Development Indicators.
Data on institutional variables is sourced from Worldwide Governance Indicators
of World Bank, and is based on Kaufmann et al. (2009). As described in Section 3,
WGI focuses on six dimensions of governance for over 200 countries over the period
1996 to 2015, and covers (a) Voice and Accountability, (b) Political Stability and
Absence of Violence, (c) Government Effectiveness, (d) Regulatory Quality, (e) Rule of
Law and (d) Control of Corruption. Using principal component analysis we create an
institutional quality index. Data on other variables that impact cross border acquisition
of assets and liabilities such as openness to trade and economic growth are sourced
from World Development Indicators. While trade openness is calculated as the ratio
of external trade (import and export) to GDP in current US Dollar, economic growth
is measured as the annual GDP growth in constant 2000 US Dollar.
4.2 Estimation Strategy
4.2.1 Static Panel Analysis
Given the above dataset our empirical model is given by the following equation
Yit = αi + βXit + ΨZit + ΦΓit + it (1)
where i refers to country and t represents the time periods. Here Y is the dependent
variable i.e. the extent of de facto openness. While X refers to the main variable of
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interest i.e. the extent of financial sector development, Z refers to the key control
variable i.e. de jure openness. Finally, Γ is a vector of other variables described above
that influence de facto openness.
We estimate Equation (1) using the feasible generalized least square estimation
(FGLS) methodology, and the results are reported in Table 1. Under FGLS, the esti-
mation strategy assumes the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation, and that the coefficient
of the AR(1) process is specific to each panel. Furthermore the error structure is as-
sumed to be heteroskedastic. At the aggregate level we find there is no relationship
between de jure openness and de facto openness. This is in line with Figure A2 which
shows de jure openness is not a good indicator of de facto openness in countries, which
have low levels of financial sector development.
In contrast, a rise in financial sector development, measured by the credit the fi-
nancial sector provides to the private sector (% of GDP), is associated with an increase
in cross border acquisition of assets and liabilities (as a percentage of GDP). De facto
openness increases by 1.48 to 1.64 percentage points of GDP as financial sector devel-
opment improves by one percentage point. As countries improve the level of financial
sector development, financial institutions are able to promote greater integration with
global capital markets by providing information to foreign investors to incentivize their
entry, facilitating interactions between foreign firms and local firms, developing mar-
kets such as equities and bond markets, and creating instruments through financial
engineering that can circumvent existing capital flow management measures.
Across most of the specifications in Table 1, interest rate differential does not have
any significant impact on de facto openness. Only in specification 5 we find a positive
and significant relationship between interest rate differential and de facto openness. In
contrast, GDP growth rates shows up as a significant and negative determinant of de
facto openness. While this may seem counterintuitive as it implies that countries, which
are growing at a rapid rate, and presumably generating more investment opportunities
are witnessing lower volume of cross border capital flow. However, the outcome can
be explained by the fact that it is typically the emerging markets that are witnessing
rapid growth, and these economies continue to experience lower volume of capital
flows, compared to the advanced economies which account for bulk of the cross border
transactions, but are growing at a much lower rate.
Table 1 also indicates that increased trade openness is associated with greater cap-
ital flows, underlying the fact that trade openness alleviates the constraint of resource
misallocation and asymmetric information, thereby incentivizing capital flows. Simi-
larly, the institutional quality index also positively influences capital flows as investors
are more confident of investing in countries, which boasts of better institutions. When
we use individual metrics of institutional quality, we find control of corruption, regu-
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latory quality and government effectiveness have a significant impact on capital flows.
However, there exists great deal of divergence among countries at various stages of
development. To understand this we undertake a subsample analysis where we look at
how the above set of factors impact cross border acquisition of assets at different income
levels. To do this we focus on countries across different income groups as per World
Bank’s classification. These include high income, upper-middle income, lower-middle
income and low-income economies. The results are reported in the Appendix in Tables
A2 to A5. We find important difference across the different income groups. First,
de jure openness shows up as an important determinant of capital flows for the high
income group, and not the other three. This could be driven by the fact that among the
high-income countries the enforcement of laws guiding the openness of capital account
is expected to be robust, and therefore de facto and de jure openness would show some
degree of co-movement. In the other income groups, a lack of enforcement would create
a divergence between de facto and de jure openness in some countries, while in others
due to variety of reasons foreign investors may be reluctant to invest despite abolition
of capital flow management measures.
In three of the four sub-samples viz. high income, upper middle income and lower
middle income economies, financial sector development continues to be a positive sig-
nificant determinant of de facto openness, across almost all specifications. However,
in the case of low income economies, the coefficient becomes negative but continues to
remain significant. The opposite sign in the low-income countries could be explained
by the fact that greater development of financial sector would be associated with some
residents opting to invest their money within the country instead of sending it abroad.7
This leads to a decline in cross border flow of capital.
The coefficient on interest rate differential is largely insignificant for most specifi-
cations across the various income levels. In only a couple of specifications in upper-
and lower-middle income countries we find the coefficient being positive an insignifi-
cant. In contrast, the coefficient on trade openness is significant and positive for all
specifications across all the country groups, reiterating the importance of a country’s
opening up to trade in facilitating greater movement of capital across borders.
The institutional index also shows up as a significant determinant of capital flows
across all income levels, barring the low-income economies. In the low-income countries
the coefficient has a negative sign but is insignificant.
7Financial development is highly correlated with GNI per capita (Atlas Method), with an R2 ≥ 0.8 across
the entire sample. Thus countries in the low-income group also tend to be characterized by low levels of
financial sector development.
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4.2.2 Dynamic Panel Analysis
One major limitation of the static model is that it does not account for the fact that fi-
nancial sector development could potentially be an endogenous regressor. As described
in Section 2, a large volume of literature has identified the role of capital account open-
ness in improving the financial sector through numerous channels. Moreover, since our
measure of de facto openness is based on acquisition of foreign assets and liabilities,
and hence is a stock measure, it is likely to be highly persistent. In such instances, it
could result in dynamic panel bias and cause biased estimates. To address both these
issues i.e. endogeneity and dynamic panel bias, we resort to generalized method of
moments i.e. Difference-GMM articulated in Arellano and Bond (1991). Under the
Differnce-GMM, the model is first differenced to remove the state-specific effects, and
the endogenous variables with their lagged levels being used as instruments. Thus
Equation (1) transforms to
∆Yit = αi + λ∆Yit−1 + ∆Xit + Ψ∆Zit + Φ∆Γit + ∆it (2)
Table 2 reports the results of Difference-GMM estimation. We focus on specifi-
cation (5) of Table 1, taking into account the lagged dependent variable (Yit−1) and
endogeneity of financial sector development. We report the results for the entire sample
as well as the country groups split according to the income levels.
As expected the lagged dependent variable is large and significant in the case of full
sample as well as the various sub-samples. Furthermore, the results indicate that even
after taking into account the persistence in de facto openness and endogeneity of finan-
cial sector development, the hypothesis that greater development of the financial sector
leads to greater acquisition of cross border assets and liabilities largely holds. As before
de jure capital account openness is a significant predictor of de facto openness only in
the case of high income countries. Lack of enforcement of capital flow management
measures and limited interest amongst investors in investing in some countries create
a dichotomy between de facto openness and de jure openness among the countries of
the other income groups.
Among the other explanatory variables, both GDP growth rate and interest rate
differential continue to be a significant predictor of de facto capital account openness in
countries belonging to either lower middle income or low income group. This continues
to be in line with the results obtained in Table 1. Improvement in institutional quality
continue to have a positive and significant impact on de facto capital account openness
in upper and lower income countries. In contrast, in low-income economies, an im-
provement in institutional quality is associated with lower de facto openness, although
the effect is not significant. A large part of the cross border movement in capital in
13
these economies takes the form of capital flight (Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003; Ngeno,
2000) due to fear of expropriation rising out of political instability and unsound eco-
nomic policies. An improvement in institutional quality can help allay these concerns,
and incentivize the residents in these economies to invest in domestic assets thereby
reducing cross border flow of capital. Finally, trade openness ceases to be a significant
predictor of de facto openness in this specification.
A key problem with the original Arellano-Bond estimator is that if the autoregres-
sive parameter of the endogenous variable is sufficiently large, and there are a limited
number of time-series observations, the Difference-GMM estimator will have a low pre-
cision and downward bias. To overcome this, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell
and Bond (1998) articulate the System-GMM, which improves the precision and re-
duces the bias. Under a System-GMM, two simultaneous equations are estimated. In
the first one original equation in levels is used with lagged first difference as instru-
ments, while in the second one first-differenced equation is used with lagged levels as
instruments.
Although the results of the System-GMM in Table 3 are broadly similar to the
Difference-GMM outlined in Table 2, there are some important differences. De facto
capital account openness continues to show strong persistence, with the lagged value
showing up as a significant predictor across all the specifications. Institutional quality
also continues to be an important predictor in upper- and lower-middle income coun-
tries, while GDP growth is negatively related to de facto openness in lower-middle and
low-income countries. Middle- and low-income countries continue to find that follow-
ing a monetary policy that results in higher real interest rates relative to the United
States helps them to attract more capital flows. Trade openness continues to remain
an insignificant variable.
An important difference, between System-GMM and Difference-GMM estimation
results relate to the size of the coefficient on the financial sector development variable.
Across the full sample, as well as sub-samples of high, upper-middle and lower-middle
income economies, the impact financial sector development on de facto capital account
openness is significantly higher under the System-GMM specification compared to the
Difference-GMM. Thus accounting for the persistence in key variables results in the
impact of financial sector development on de facto openness to be considerably large.
Moreover, across both Difference-GMM and System-GMM, the impact of financial
sector development on de facto openness is highest in the high-income economies,
followed by upper-middle and lower-middle income countries. Consequently, our results
indicate that as countries move across the income spectrum, the impact of financial
sector development on capital account openness increases steadily.
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4.2.3 Threshold Panel Analysis
A key finding from the sub-sample analysis above is that across various empirical spec-
ifications, the relationship between financial sector development and de facto openness
is not linear. In low-income countries, which are also countries with lower level of finan-
cial sector development, an improvement in the level of financial sector development is
associated with either a drop in the level of de facto openness or an insignificant impact.
On the other hand, for lower-middle, upper-middle and high income countries, which
are characterized by better developed financial sector, there is a significant positive
impact of financial sector development on de facto openness. Thus there is a threshold
effect on the relationship between financial sector development and de facto openness.
Only above a certain threshold level of economic development the level of financial
sector development is beneficial for de facto openness. In this section we formally test
this hypothesis employing threshold regression.
Threshold regression has been widely used to study economic relationships between
key macroeconomic variables including financial sector development and growth, in-
flation and growth etc. However, according to our knowledge, ours is the first paper
that is using this empirical tool to analyze the relationship between financial sector
development and de facto openness. We use the dynamic panel threshold model devel-
oped by Kremer et al. (2013), which is the that extends the original static setup model
introduced in Hansen (1999) to endogenous regressors. 8 We consider the following
threshold model of financial sector development and de facto openness.
This paper introduces a dynamic version of Hansen?s panel threshold model to shed
more light on the inflation-growth nexus. By applying the forward orthogonal devia-
tions transformation suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995), we combine the instru-
mental variable estimation of the cross-sectional threshold model introduced by Caner
and Hansen (2004) with the panel threshold model of Hansen (1999). In the dynamic
model, the endogeneity of important control variables is no longer an issue. This per-
mits us to estimate the critical level of inflation for economic growth for industrialized
and non-industrialized countries albeit the endogeneity problem of initial income.
Yit = αi + β1XitI(Xit ≤ γ) + δ1I(Xit ≤ γ)
+β2XitI(Xit ≥ γ) + ΦΓit + +it (3)
While Yit and Xit continue to be the de facto openness and financial sector de-
velopment, Γit denotes the partly endogenous control variables. However, now Xit
8We would like to express our gratitude to Alexander Bick for sharing the MATLAB code for the panel
dynamic threshold tests.
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is both the threshold variable, and the regime dependent regressor. Following Bick
(2010), we allow for differences in the regime intercepts (δi). Within Γit initial income
is considered as the endogenous variable, while the remaining are the control variables
described above.
Given the need for a strongly balanced panel data for panel dynamic threshold
regression model and the requirement of a large number of cross section units with a
small number of time periods, we average the data set over four year periods i.e. 1996-
1999, 2000-2003, 2004-2007, 2008-2011 and 2012-2015. This gives us 5 observations
for each country with a total of 610 observations. The results of the panel dynamic
threshold regression model are presented in Table 4. The estimated financial sector
development threshold of of 0.243 implies credit to private sector from banking and
non-banking sources comprise 24.3% of GDP. There are 236 observations below the
threshold, with a majority of these being in the first two periods, i.e. 1996-1999 and
2000-2003. The regime dependent coefficients of financial sector development i.e. βˆ1
and βˆ2 have the expected signs and are significant. Financial sector development is
negatively correlated with de facto openness (βˆ1 = -0.367) when financial sector devel-
opment is below the threshold, while the opposite is true at higher levels of financial
sector development (βˆ2 = 0.689).
Given the high correlation between the level of financial sector development and
GNI per capita, the fitted line shows that the threshold level of financial sector de-
velopment (0.243) corresponds to GNI per capita of around 900 (current US$, Atlas
method). This corresponds to almost the middle of the range of the cap for classifying
low income countries, which increased from 785 in 1997 to 1045 in 2014 (Fantom and
Serajuddin, 2016), and is thus consistent with our results obtained in Sections 4.2.1
and 4.2.2.
Thus, the threshold regression analysis shows that there is a non monotonic re-
lationship between financial sector development and de facto openness. At very low
levels of financial sector development, an improvement in financial sector development
reduces de facto openness as domestic investors are incentivized to reduce outward in-
vestment, and invest within the domestic economy. After financial sector development
crosses the threshold, a further increase in financial sector development leads to an
increase in de facto openness, reflecting increased cross border acquisition of foreign
assets and liabilities.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the relationship between financial sector development,
proxied by credit provided to the private sector from banking and non banking sources
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(% of GDP), and cross border acquisition of assets and liabilities or de facto openness.
To that aim we built an empirical model analyzing this relationship, controlling for
numerous factors found in the literature to influence the cross border acquisition of
assets and liabilities. These include, regulations governing the acquisition of these
assets and liabilities, interest rate differential, economic growth and extent of trade.
Initial static panel data analysis shows that financial sector development has a strong
positive and significant influence on de facto openness. A sub-sample analysis based on
GNI per capita highlights that the positive influence is largely driven by high, upper-
middle and lower-middle income economies, with the nature of relationship reversing in
the case of low income economies. Across the various specifications, we find regulations
governing the cross border acquisition of assets and liabilities have a significant impact
on these cross border operations only in the high income countries.
The robustness of these results are verified by incorporating the dynamic panel
specification where we account for presence of some persistence in cross border acqui-
sition of assets and liabilities, and that de facto openness influences development of
the financial sector through numerous channels, and is hence an endogenous regressor.
We find our results to be robust with financial sector development continuing to be
a significant predictor of de facto openness in high, upper-middle and lower-middle
income countries, In the case of low income economies, while both System-GMM and
Difference-GMM estimations indicate a negative relationship, the relationship is sig-
nificant only in the case of System-GMM estimation.
A major contribution of the paper is the adoption of the dynamic panel model to
capture the threshold level of financial sector development, where the relationship be-
tween financial sector development and de facto openness switches from being negative
to positive. The empirical results indicate that the financial sector development thresh-
old level corresponds to the middle of the range of the cap for classifying low income
countries over the period we cover, thereby validating our finding that the relationship
is generally negative in low income countries, but becomes positive as financial sector
development and income level increases.
Our analysis indicates that once countries have crossed a threshold level of finan-
cial sector development, any further increase in financial sector development results in
enhanced linkage with global capital markets by allowing greater cross border acqui-
sition of assets and liabilities through a variety of channels. These include reducing
information asymmetry for foreign investors, facilitating interactions between foreign
firms and local firms and developing instruments through financial engineering that can
circumvent existing capital flow management measures. Consequently, more finance is
not necessarily always better as it can result in domestic economy becoming integrated
with global capital markets to an extent that is detrimental to macroeconomic stability.
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By getting channelled towards easily collateralized, non-tradable investments like real
estate, foreign capital can engender asset price booms and bust, which are costly for
the real economy. Volatile foreign capital flows can also cause sharp valuation swings
in the equity market and abrupt movements in the real exchange rate, both of which
can have strong implications for the real sector (Prasad et al., 2007a; Subramanian
et al., 2007).
Consequently, it is very important for the policymakers to know the optimal level
of financial sector development. Instead of solely focusing on increasing the extent of
financial sector development, the policymakers should strive to strengthen the quality
of intermediation. The financial sector has limited standing of its own, and derives
its strength and resilience from the real economy. Thus the real sector should be the
driver of the financial sector, not the other way round.
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Figure 1: Evolution of Capital Account Openness
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
De
 F
ac
to
 O
pe
ne
ss
 (F
or
eig
n A
ss
et
s a
nd
 L
iab
ilit
ies
 (%
 o
f G
DP
))
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
All Countries Emerging Markets
OECD Countries
(a) De Facto Openness
-1
0
1
2
De
 Ju
re
 O
pe
nn
es
s (
Ch
inn
 It
o 
In
de
x)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
All Countries Emerging Markets
OECD Countries
(b) De Jure Openness
Source: Authors’ estimates based Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Chinn and Ito (2006).
Figure 2: Quantitative Easing by OECD Countries
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Figure 3: Evolution of Trade Openness
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Figure 5: Institutional Quality Index (2014)
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Figure 6: Evolution of Financial Sector Development Indicators
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Table 1: Determinants of De Facto Capital Account Openness
(Full Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 1.131*** 1.119*** 1.136*** 0.884*** 0.860***
[31.239] [33.274] [40.876] [25.033] [15.776]
De Jure Openness 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.007 0.008
[1.455] [1.277] [1.621] [0.823] [0.605]
Financial Development 1.476*** 1.499*** 1.565*** 1.548*** 1.641***
[16.827] [17.000] [18.002] [17.320] [14.859]
Interest Rate Differential -0.04 -0.057 -0.011 0.149**
[-1.028] [-1.437] [-0.274] [2.392]
GDP Growth -0.442*** -0.442*** -0.592***
[-5.413] [-4.947] [-4.230]
Trade Openness 0.378*** 0.373***
[8.156] [6.043]
Institution Quality 0.154***
[4.815]
Observations 3,929 3,929 3,889 3,875 2,579
Number of Countries 173 173 173 172 172
Source: Authors’ Estimates
Notes: Robust z-statistics in parenthesis; *** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at
5% and * indicates significant at 10%.
Table 2: Determinants of De Facto Capital Account Openness (Difference-
GMM)
Full High Upper Middle Lower Middle Low
Sample Income Income Income Income
Constant 0.669 -1.72 1.455* 0.299*** 0.062
[1.566] [-0.988] [1.938] [3.700] [0.420]
Lagged De Facto Openness 0.758*** 0.739*** 0.873*** 0.736*** 0.891***
[51.128] [26.965] [46.761] [27.709] [29.940]
De Jure Openness 0.257 0.610*** -0.036 0.013 0.015
[1.427] [3.791] [-0.195] [0.506] [0.163]
Financial Development 0.891** 1.337** 0.997** 0.391*** -0.046
[2.435] [2.348] [2.008] [3.286] [-0.096]
Interest Rate Differential 0.208 -0.307 -0.383 0.640*** 0.224**
[0.259] [-0.121] [-0.264] [3.649] [1.978]
GDP Growth -3.089** -4.744 -0.959 -1.232*** -3.508***
[-2.095] [-1.010] [-0.399] [-3.817] [-8.184]
Institution Quality 0.068 0.077 0.837** 0.133** -0.203*
[0.161] [0.080] [1.977] [1.974] [-1.780]
Trade Openness -0.261 -0.036 1.824 0.067 0.132
[-0.494] [-0.035] [1.756] [0.707] [0.562]
Observations 1,937 570 535 461 269
Number of Countries 171 51 45 40 25
Source: Authors’ Estimates
Notes: Robust z-statistics in parenthesis; *** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5% and *
indicates significant at 10%.
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Table 3: Determinants of De Facto Capital Account Openness (System-
GMM)
Full High Upper Middle Lower Middle Low
Sample Income Income Income Income
Constant 0.356 1.19 2.279 0.428** 0.027
[0.698] [1.589] [1.457] [2.383] [0.249]
Lagged De Facto Openness 0.755*** 0.834*** 0.779*** 0.715*** 0.884***
[26.452] [46.076] [5.410] [10.133] [23.429]
De Jure Openness 0.087 0.375** -0.334 -0.007 -0.132*
[0.523] [1.981] [-0.678] [-0.495] [-1.729]
Financial Development 1.804*** 2.186*** 2.062** 1.257** -0.300**
[3.881] [3.329] [2.308] [2.264] [-1.992]
Interest Rate Differential 2.056 -0.373 1.324** 0.482*** 0.115**
[1.454] [-0.158] [1.974] [3.010] [1.926]
GDP Growth -3.882** -2.425 -2.667 -0.813** -1.611***
[-2.470] [-1.091] [-1.584] [-2.033] [-4.510]
Institution Quality 0.665 1.250* 0.300** 0.264** -0.059
[1.443] [1.876] [2.201] [1.986] [-0.524]
Trade Openness -0.389 0.411 -3.037 -0.142 -0.059
[-0.545] [0.444] [-1.507] [-0.871] [-0.339]
Observations 2,577 761 705 611 363
Number of Countries 172 51 45 40 25
Source: Authors’ Estimates
Notes: Robust z-statistics in parenthesis; *** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5% and *
indicates significant at 10%.
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Table 4: Determinants of De
Facto Capital Account Open-
ness (Panel Threshold)
Value of Threshold Parameters
γ̂ 0.243
95% Confidence Interval 0.187 0.266
Impact of Financial Sector Development
βˆ1 -0.367***
[-0.051]
βˆ2 0.689***
[0.179]
Impact of Covariates
De Jure Openness 0.058
[1.166]
Interest Rate Differential 0.925***
[0.160]
GDP Growth 0.590**
[0.133]
Institutional Quality 0.923***
[0.233]
Trade Openness -0.827
[1.827]
Number of Observations 610
Number of Countries 122
Source: Authors’ Estimates
Notes: Robust z-statistics in parenthesis;
*** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates
significant at 5% and * indicates significant at
10%.
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Appendix: List of Figures
Figure A1: Volatility Across Various Types of Capital Flows
	
(a) Advanced Economies
	
(b) Emerging Economies
Source: Bluedorn et al. (2013) & Authors’ Estimates
32
Figure A2: Relationship Between Financial Development and Capital Account Openness
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Source: Cihak et al. (2012), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), Chinn and Ito (2006) & Authors’ Estimates
Appendix: List of Tables
Table A1: Various Indicators of Financial Sector Development)
Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Private credit by deposit money banks (% of GDP) 4790 40.13 36.69 0.22 262.46
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 4835 43.55 40.27 0.00 312.15
Deposit money banks assets (% of GDP) 4794 49.71 41.37 0.23 263.13
Financial system deposits (% of GDP) 4751 44.85 41.91 0.07 479.67
Liquid liabilities (% of GDP) 4758 52.15 41.55 3.29 399.11
Mutual fund assets (% of GDP) 1264 27.14 70.55 0.00 788.28
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) 2661 47.71 79.98 0.01 1086.34
Stock market total value traded (% of GDP) 2742 21.8 50.48 0.00 822.32
Source: Authors’ Estimates from Global Financial Development
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Table A2: Determinants of De Facto Capital Account Openness
(High Income Countries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.740*** 0.721*** 0.786*** 0.343* -0.129
[5.551] [6.261] [6.836] [1.886] [-0.441]
De Jure Openness 0.086*** 0.088*** 0.098*** 0.083** 0.123*
[2.821] [2.901] [3.255] [2.474] [1.809]
Financial Development 2.157*** 2.206*** 2.258*** 2.383*** 3.008***
[12.766] [13.429] [13.507] [12.631] [12.013]
Interest Rate Differential -0.431 -0.379 -0.198 0.275
[-1.452] [-1.113] [-0.952] [1.187]
GDP Growth -0.06 -0.426 -0.252
[-0.184] [-1.141] [-0.437]
Trade Openness 0.584*** 0.697***
[3.580] [3.075]
Institution Quality 0.236***
[2.591]
Observations 1,172 1,172 1,159 1,157 762
Number of groups 52 52 52 51 51
Source: Authors’ Estimates
Notes: Robust z-statistics in parenthesis; *** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant
at 5% and * indicates significant at 10%.
Table A3: Determinants of De Facto Capital Account Openness
(Upper Middle Income Countries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.833*** 0.824*** 0.843*** 0.853*** 1.077***
[17.118] [17.232] [16.955] [13.110] [12.215]
De Jure Openness -0.020* -0.020* -0.017 -0.017 -0.025
[-1.858] [-1.876] [-1.589] [-1.530] [-1.319]
Financial Development 0.874*** 0.882*** 0.866*** 0.851*** 1.115***
[9.296] [9.323] [8.616] [8.292] [7.879]
Interest Rate Differential 0.008 0.009 0.005 0.186**
[0.192] [0.211] [0.122] [2.547]
GDP Growth -0.446*** -0.450*** -0.224
[-4.033] [-3.983] [-1.112]
Trade Openness 0.029** 0.116
[2.455] [1.166]
Institution Quality 0.087**
[1.969]
Observations 1,054 1,054 1,041 1,041 705
Number of groups 45 45 45 45 45
Source: Authors’ Estimates
Notes: Robust z-statistics in parenthesis; *** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant
at 5% and * indicates significant at 10%.
34
Table A4: Determinants of De Facto Capital Account Openness
(Lower Middle Income Countries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 1.170*** 1.086*** 1.103*** 0.908*** 1.101***
[18.925] [19.344] [21.166] [15.861] [17.726]
De Jure Openness 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.006 0.004
[1.339] [1.088] [0.978] [0.535] [0.262]
Financial Development 0.099 0.203** 0.197** 0.129** 0.207**
[0.850] [1.973] [1.970] [1.987] [2.189]
Interest Rate Differential -0.076 -0.095 -0.061 0.169**
[-1.010] [-1.265] [-0.833] [1.983]
GDP Growth -0.748*** -0.945*** -0.749***
[-4.465] [-5.517] [-3.452]
Trade Openness 0.373*** 0.471***
[6.013] [7.940]
Institution Quality 0.060**
[2.119]
Observations 909 909 908 898 612
Number of groups 40 40 40 40 40
Source: Authors’ Estimates
Notes: Robust z-statistics in parenthesis; *** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at
5% and * indicates significant at 10%.
Table A5: Determinants of De Facto Capital Account Openness
(Low Income Countries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 1.080*** 1.084*** 1.111*** 0.853*** 0.855***
[18.984] [19.285] [19.650] [11.298] [8.326]
De Jure Openness 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.014 0.053
[0.860] [0.862] [0.901] [0.502] [0.999]
Financial Development -0.669*** -0.676*** -0.731*** -0.547** -0.139
[-2.883] [-2.924] [-3.168] [-2.065] [-0.403]
Interest Rate Differential 0.001 -0.004 -0.101 -0.007
[0.017] [-0.086] [-1.442] [-0.081]
GDP Growth -0.489*** -0.439*** -0.553***
[-3.746] [-3.231] [-2.631]
Trade Openness 0.783*** 0.590***
[7.551] [4.283]
Institution Quality -0.066
[-1.427]
Observations 575 575 568 568 363
Number of groups 25 25 25 25 25
Source: Authors’ Estimates
Notes: Robust z-statistics in parenthesis; *** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at
5% and * indicates significant at 10%.
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